Introduction
The age of jointness was ushered in by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and its evolution hastened by the lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the numerous peace operations that followed in their wake.
Joint vernacular is increasingly spoken and understood in the rank and file of all our military services. Joint
Task Forces (JTF) have become the preferred method of executing military operations both in war and military operations other than war (MOOTW).
C'est bon, let's declare victory in the war on "jointness" and move on to something else. If only it were that easy. Although significant progress has been made, joint doctrine is still evolving and even if most of us can "talk the talk" we've yet to effectively "walk the walk".
Operational intelligence is no exception. In recent years its tenets have found space in joint publications but only in sufficient detail to hint at the capabilities that exist. Operational intelligence is "intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas." Intelligence plays a vital role in the conduct of successful joint operations. Proper employment of collection and analysis assets is essential if joint force commanders are to gain and maintain information superiority. Without accurate intelligence, our joint forces will lose the essential advantages of surprise, operational security, and flexibility. … Joint force commanders, planners, and warfighters at all levels are encouraged to become thoroughly familiar with the doctrine in this publication and use it as a tool for meeting the Nation's future challenges. HUMINT is derived from the analysis of foreign positive information collected by a trained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human contacts and informants as a tool, and a variety of collection methods to gather information that satisfies the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and cues other collection resources. 3 HUMINT includes both controlled-source acquisition and overt collection (including documents and other material), such as interrogations of prisoners of war, debriefings of US citizens and foreign nationals, and official contacts with foreign governments.
All combatant commanders have a force protection mission. Inherent in that responsibility is an active CI effort. CI is an intelligence function vice a discipline and as such is separate and distinct from HUMINT. CI is defined as:
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. 4 In other words, CI must detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize adversary efforts to gain information, exploit our vulnerabilities, and strike our organizations and facilities. The purpose of CI collection is force protection and many times HUMINT collection techniques are HUMINT is similar to other intelligence disciplines such as IMINT and SIGINT in that the purpose of its collection is to identify critical factors about the enemy to contribute to the all source picture of the battlefield. The HUMINT Collector's job is complete once the information has been obtained and reported. The CI special agent's job is just beginning once information is collected that indicates a potential threat to the JTF. CI must then take active countermeasures to exploit and/or neutralize that threat. Existing and emerging peace operations doctrine notes the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) to varying degrees, but it does not assign to it the overwhelming importance that commanders and J2s continue to learn from one operation to another. … Successive peace operations clearly reflect the necessity to establish a full-spectrum HUMINT network throughout the operational area and the reality that poor HUMINT simultaneously risks overall mission failure and protection of the peace force itself. Repeatedly peace operations commanders and J2s have reiterated that HUMINT was their most important intelligence resource. 6 As a result, new operational intelligence planning imperatives are required. The top two imperatives are; 1) make intelligence support to force protection the foremost priority, and 2) make HUMINT paramount. 7 Somalia is an interesting case study which clearly identifies the relevance of these intelligence imperatives. During Operation Restore Hope, CI and HUMINT personnel coordinated directly with local authorities and humanitarian NGOs to gain valuable insight into the Mogadishu system of government and culture providing the JFC the situational understanding necessary to accomplish the mission. 8 Unfortunately, this understanding of the importance of cultural intelligence did not carry over to the subsequent UNOSOM II mission.
The following account is from the Joint Military Operations Historical Collection:
As the mission in Somalia changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement during UNOSOM II, the UN failed to develop a full awareness of the local population's disposition and did not obtain adequate intelligence on the adversary's intentions and capabilities … The JFC underestimated the military capabilities of rival factions, and as a result, UN forces were not adequately prepared for contingency situations. 9 Operation Joint Endeavor provides another illustrative example of the increased importance of CI and HUMINT. The following excerpt from the principal lessons learned document from Bosnia reiterates that point as follows, Doctrine, CONOPS, procedures, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities had to be adjusted and augmented to accommodate peace operation requirements. Experience with other OOTWs also clearly demonstrated that although non-intrusive means of collecting information were especially useful, HUMINT [includes CI in this context] was usually key. In Bosnia, the man and woman on the ground collecting firsthand information about political leaders, business people, the conditions of roads and bridges, withdrawal of forces from the ZOS [zones of separation], weapons and ammunition in cantonment areas, freedom of movement violations, and demonstrations and ethnic incidents proved invaluable. Over time, HUMINT became the dominant player in the IFOR intelligence operation. … The counterintelligence and HUMINT activities in Bosnia were also essential to accomplishing the force protection mission by providing the information and intelligence the commander needed to manage and avoid risk and still accomplish the mission. 10 This assessment mirrors many other reports which indicate CI and HUMINT reporting were responsible for over 80% of the actionable intelligence in Bosnia. In fact, the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Intelligence Summary (INTSUM), the most important intelligence product in theater, was nearly 100% composed from intelligence generated by HUMINT collection. is an integral element, to improve the JTF's "reach-back" capability for assistance in answering task force priority intelligence requirements.
The remainder of this paper will focus on the "value added" of the above organizations and collection entities. EPWs. 15 Among the categories of personnel exploited at a JIF are; EPWs, civilian internees, detained persons, insurgents, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents/suspected agents, emigres and resettlers. 16 JIFs are equally applicable to military operations other than war as they are to major theater wars. "When the plan for Operation Uphold Democracy changed from a forced entry to a permissive entry the JIF was turned back to Ft. Bragg and not initially employed. This proved to be a mistake, and a JIF was subsequently stood up a week after initial entry." 
Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC)
The JDEC exploits captured enemy documents (CEDs) to provide tactical, operational and strategic information to the theater JTF and its subordinate commands. "CEDs are any written or graphical data contained on any form of media. … These documents include, but are not limited to: handwritten, typed or computer generated data or images stored on paper or paper-like substance; photographs; maps, charts, or overlays; video or audio tapes or other media used to store recorded material; and automated data processing storage media, other than component hardware." I will never let a man or woman in uniform deploy to a crisis or conflict without the best information our country can provide. I would never tolerate the loss of a single man or woman because some bureaucrat in Washington wants to have a philosophic debate about requirements. 25 Theater commanders and J2s should capitalize on this military friendly environment by fully engaging the DCI Representative and OMA in support of exercises and operations to ensure procedures are in place prior to a crisis situation.
Conclusion
Peace operations will continue to dominate the use of our military forces. Moreover, the JTF approach that has steadily evolved since Hopefully, this paper will serve as a first step in educating senior commanders on the critical role CI and HUMINT can and must play on the MOOTW battlefields we are likely to engage on for the foreseeable future.
